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Abstract
This paper uncovers and quantifies Israel’s exports to countries that ban trade with
Israel. Israel exported a total of $6.4 billion worth of merchandise to boycott countries
between 1962 and 2012, and most of this trade is illicit, i.e. not recorded by the
importers. We find that electronic exports to Malaysia account for the lion’s share
of this trade but it also includes a wide array of products from footwear to fruit and
vegetables. Our estimates suggest Israel’s exports to these countries would be 10 times
larger without the boycott. On top of providing further evidence on the unintended
consequences of unilateral trade bans, this paper provides a case study on the role of
politics in international trade.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Economists have recently paid much attention to the role of politics in international trade.
Umana Dajud (2013) showed that political distance, i.e. the correlation between countries’
voting behavior at the United Nations’ General Assembly, has a negative impact on bilateral
trade; Michaels and Zhi (2010) showed that when France and the US disagreed over war
in Iraq at the UN, their bilateral trade fell; Fuchs and Klann (2013) showed that countries
officially receiving the Dalai Lama at the highest political level see their exports to China
fall; and Fisman et al. (2014) that the stock prices of Japanese companies with high China
exposure suffer when Sino-Japanese relations suddenly deteriorate, as during the Senkaku
Island dispute. Heilmann (2016) showed that consumer boycotts resulting from political
events, such as the boycott of Danish goods by Muslim countries following the publication
of a Muhammad comic in 2005, have strong negative effects on bilateral trade.
One country whose trade is particularly affected by international politics is Israel. According
to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has diplomatic ties only with 158 out of 192
UN member states. The Arab League, i.e. 22 Middle Eastern and African countries, has
maintained a boycott of Israeli companies and goods since the founding of Israel in 1948.1
The boycott prohibits citizens from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business
contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. It is not limited to the
1The Arab League Boycott can be traced back to the Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine
when Arab leaders sought to ban products of Jewish industry in Palestine to deter Jewish immigration to
the region. The first formal declaration of boycott was issued in 1945. It stated that “Products of Palestinian
Jews are to be considered undesirable in Arab countries. They should be prohibited and refused as long as
their production in Palestine might lead to the realization of Zionist political aim” (Losman, 1972).
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Arab League since four Latin-American countries have cut trade ties with Israel due to
governments’ political leaning or after conflicts such as the June 2010 Gaza flotilla raid.2,3
In theory, the boycott should make trade between Israel and boycott countries nonexistent.
Unlike the consumer boycotts examined by Heilmann (2016), the Arab League Boycott is
an official government policy. According to Adelman (2008) the boycott has been enforced
though instruments such as customs legislation requiring strict certificates of origin, ship
regulations, a blacklist of companies, as well as prison sentences for offending businessmen.
According to the Jerusalem Post (2006) the Office of the Arab Boycott, based in Damascus,
had a blacklist of 8,500 companies that were dealing with Israeli companies or trading at
the Haifa port. Yet its asymmetry, i.e. Israel being open to trade with boycott countries4,
and its geography, i.e. Israel being nearby many boycott countries, make it hard to enforce
it completely. Moreover enthusiasm for the boycott and its enforcement have varied over
the years. While support decreased with the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, it regained
strength during the Second Intifada in the early 2000s after the failure of the Camp David
2In 1973 during the Yom Kippur War Cuba was the first Latin American country to cut ties with Israel.
Venezuela and Bolivia cut ties in 2009 after an Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, while Nicaragua
cut ties in 2010 after the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid. According to Senkman (2014), the cutting of ties is
more of “an integral part of international struggle to develop political, social and economic alternatives that
enhance justice, equality and sovereignty of the peoples” than a political strategy against imperialism and of
non-alignment with American foreign policy.
3The countries that boycotted Israel during our period of study (1962-2012) are (periods of non-boycott
are in parenthesis): Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain (1996-2000), Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia (until 2010),
Brunei, Chad (until 1973), Comoros, Cuba (until 1973), Djibouti, Guinea (until 1969), Indonesia, Iran (until
1979), Iraq, North Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali (until 1973), Mauritania (2000-2009),
Morocco (1993-2000), Nicaragua (until 1982, 1992-2010), Niger (until 1973, 1996-2002), Oman (1996-2000),
Pakistan, Qatar (1996-2009), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia (1996-2000), United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela (until 2009), and Yemen.
4Israel prohibits trade with only three enemy countries, Iran, Lebanon and Syria as per the Trading with
the Enemy Ordinance of 1939.
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negotiations (Adelman, 2008).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some trade has been taking place. In a 2005 interview,
Gil Feiler, director of a Tel Aviv consultancy specializing in Arab markets and economics
professor at Bar Ilan University, suggested that the trade was worth around US$400 million a
year and that it consisted mostly of agricultural equipment, animal vaccines and technological
components (Mortimer, 2005). More recently Haaretz (2012) reported that Israel had
exported Internet surveillance and monitoring equipment to Iran over five years through
a Danish distributor, electricity to Indonesia using Singapore as a business base, shingles to
Dubai for its Palm Islands through an Italian roofing tile company, and plastic products such
as disposable utensils and food packaging to Saudi Arabia through US-registered subsidiaries
(Sadeh, 2012). The Associated Press (2005) suggested that exports may be transhipped via
Cyprus or the Netherlands, for example, which list the shipments as local exports. It also
cites Gil Feiler saying that “Arabs of Lebanese origin in Israel sell counterfeit Lebanese
certificates of origin complete with forged government stamps. Some Israeli factories have
departments of so-called quality control - where any Hebrew writing or Made in Israel marks
are removed from product components.” The Jerusalem Post (2006) suggested that a company
provides customers with US mailing addresses where Israeli products can be sent. It then
exchanges the Israeli postal stamped packaging for a US-stamped package and sends it on
to its Arab destination. Finally, Kleiman (1998) looked into the trade data and concluded
that the existence of a substantial clandestine trade by Israel with the Arab countries was
doubtful, despite rumors of rerouting via Cyprus, Egypt, and Turkey.
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In this paper we dig into official trade statistics from UN Comtrade to investigate trade
between Israel and its boycott countries. Israel’s export statistics suggest that Israel exported
more than $6.4 billion worth of merchandise to boycott countries between 1962 and 2012,
or 0.74% of total Israeli exports. The illicit, or boycott-avoiding, nature of the trade is
confirmed by the fact that most boycott countries do not to report imports from Israel,
creating a gap between the two countries’ trade statistics. We find that electronic exports
to Malaysia account for the lion’s share of this gap and can be matched with Malaysia’s
official statistics on imports from Unspecified countries, thus highlighting one way by which
this trade is kept below the radar. Using data on world input-output production linkages
(TiVA), we also show that boycott countries imported Israeli value-added embedded in other
countries’ exports at a rate that is no different from that of non-boycott countries, suggesting
that international supply chains may render boycotts ineffective. Nonetheless, our estimates
suggest that Israeli exports to boycott countries are still about 90% lower than they would
be absent the boycott. If Israel had exported to boycott countries proportionally to their
GDP in 2012, for example, total Israeli exports would have been $59.8 billion rather than
$59 billion, which is an increase worth around 0.3% of GDP.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effectiveness of sanctions in
reducing trade. Hufbauer et al. (2007) looked at more than 200 sanction episodes up to 2000
and found that sanctions are less likely to succeed when they are applied by less-important or
antagonistic countries. Other studies include Caruso (2003), who showed that comprehensive
US sanctions have a negative impact on trade with target countries, Levy (1999) who showed
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that the sanctions applied in the 1980s to push for the end of apartheid had little impact
on South Africa’s trade, and Haidar et al. (2015) who showed that Iranian exporters have
diverted trade from the US and EU to other destinations after sanctions were imposed
to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It also contributes to the literature on illicit trade
pioneered by Fisman and Wei (2004) who showed that asymmetric trade barriers such as
high import tariffs often create a trade gap between imports and exports, as exporters hide
or under-invoice their shipments to avoid import tariffs. Other studies have shown that
corruption in the trade-barrier country makes illicit trade even more prevalent (e.g. Fisman
and Wei (2009)), and it’s also possible to find traces of illicit trade in stock-market reactions
to news (DellaVigna and Ferrara, 2010). Our paper follows this line of work to uncover and
quantify exports from Israel to boycott countries. In doing so it also provides a case study
to complement our understanding of the role of politics and foreign policy in international
trade.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the data and
present descriptive statistics on the boycott-avoiding trade. In Section 3 we discuss estimates
of the effect of the boycott on Israel’s exports and Section 4 concludes.
2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In order to look into Israel’s trade with boycott countries we use trade data from UN
Comtrade, and information on Israel’s international relations retrieved from the Israel Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs and Wikipedia. We define boycott countries as those that ban trade with
Israel. This includes countries that do not recognize the existence of Israel or that have
no diplomatic relations. Some countries had formal economic ties in some years despite
no diplomatic relations, i.e. Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia. These are not
considered boycott countries in years where trade was not banned. Boycott status may thus
change over time. The list of countries that boycotted Israel during our period of study
(1962-2012) can be found in footnote 3.
A first look at the data suggests that Israel does report exports to boycott countries.
Israel’s exports statistics suggest $6.4 billion of exports have gone to boycott countries
between 1962 and 2012. That represents around 0.74% of total Israeli exports. Figure 1
and Table 1 provide the country and product distribution of these exports, while Figure 2
shows the evolution of this trade over time. It shows large export flows in 2000 and 2010.
A closer look at the data reveals that Israel exported $714,268,000 to Malaysia as “Special
transact. Not class. Accord. To kind” in 2000. In 2010, Israel exported $778,418,000 to
Malaysia as “Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances”. The Times of Israel (2014)
suggests that most of these exports to Malaysia were from Israel’s Intel computer-chip factory
in Kiryat Gat (Atkins, 2014). Figure 1 and Table 1 suggest that these exports to Malaysia
account for most of this gap. Yet, Israeli exports also include a wide array of products from
plastics to fruit and vegetables.
A second look at the data suggests that many boycott countries do not report most of
this trade, giving rise to a large trade gap. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, not all trade goes
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unreported at import customs, suggesting that the boycott has not been enforced constantly
over the years. When we look at the evolution of the trade gap, i.e. the log difference
between reported Israeli exports and reported imports, the usual measure of missing trade
in the literature (Fisman and Wei, 2004), we note there is a large positive and significant
trade gap between Israel and boycott countries from 2001 onwards (Figure 3). This gap
does not appear in non-boycott countries nor in previous years. This can be explained by
a change of boycott stance during the Second Intifada and increased violence within the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5
To examine further how Israel’s exports circumvent the boycott and create a trade gap
we start with the case of Malaysia, as it accounts for most of this trade. As seen in Figure 4,
Malaysia’s imports from Unspecified countries seem to match Israel’s exports to Malaysia,
except for a couple of years in the late 2000s. A closer look at the industry-level data,
shown in Table 2, reveals that in 2000 and 2010, the two years in which Israel’s export to
Malaysia peaked, Israel’s report of Special transactions closely matched Malaysia’s imports
of Electric machinery and apparatus from Unspecified countries. This is in line with the
anecdotal evidence of Intel chips exports and it suggests that one way in which the boycott
is circumvented is simply by hiding the provenance of the goods by declaring them from
Unspecified countries. We looked for other such cases in other boycott countries but find
none as clear cut.6
5Calls for a stronger enforcement of the boycott in 2001 led to the first meeting the Central Boycott Office
in Damascus since April 1993 (USTR, 2003).
6We also looked for traces of fake certificates of origin, from Cyprus, Lebanon or Turkey in industry level
data but found no such evidence. This type of practice may be hard to detect as often the volume of imports
from such third countries drowns Israel export reports. For example Oman’s imports from Lebanon are
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To investigate boycott-avoiding behavior further we use another source of data to see
whether boycott countries import Israeli goods and services embedded in other countries’
exports via global value chains. Specifically, we quantify the Israeli value-added embedded
in other countries’ exports to boycott countries using data from TiVA, a dataset on Trade in
Value-Added compiled by the OECD (see Koopman et al. (2014) for the decomposition of
gross trade flows in value-added flows). This is relevant specifically as the boycott not only
banned direct trade with Israel but also trade with any company doing business with Israel,
indeed maintaining a blacklist of more than 8,000 companies as discussed in the introduction.
TiVA includes data for the years 1995, 2005, and 2011 for 61 economies covering the OECD,
EU, and G20 but only 5 boycott countries are included, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia.
We find that these boycott countries imported Israeli value-added embedded in other
countries’ exports at a rate that is no different from that of non-boycott countries. In 2011
for example, Saudi Arabia imported $22 million of Israeli value added only via US imports.
This is much larger than the $144,000 worth of exports to Saudi Arabia that Israel declares.
If we compute the Israeli share of imported embedded value added, we find it no lower on
average in boycott countries than in non-boycott countries, at around 0.37% (Figure 5),
suggesting that international supply chains may make boycotts ineffective.
worth 100 times more than Israel’s export to Oman, or Saudi Arabia imports from Turkey are 2000 times
larger than Israel’s exports to Saudi Arabia.
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3 BOYCOTT EFFECTS ON ISRAELI EXPORTS
The descriptive evidence above suggests there are indeed substantial exports from Israel
to boycott countries. In order to illustrate how much larger Israeli export flows could be
absent the boycott we plot Israel’s exports against destination GDPs in Figure 6. A vast
body of theoretical and empirical work on the gravity of trade flows shows that exports
rise proportionately with the economic size of destination countries. Israel’s exports fit this
pattern. As Figure 6 shows, 2012 Israeli exports are well predicted by destination GDPs,
with an average elasticity of 1.22, except in the case of boycott countries for which exports fall
below the GDP prediction in most cases.7 The case of boycott countries in the Middle East
such as Lebanon, Yemen or Oman is particularly illustrative. Being geographically close to
Israel, they should, if anything, be above the GDP prediction line as proximity makes those
markets more accessible for Israeli products than other markets with similar economic size.
What we observe instead is that the boycott policy decreases Israeli exports dramatically
and these destination markets appear way below the prediction line. An approximative
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that if Israeli exports to boycott countries moved
on the GDP prediction line, total Israeli exports would increase from $59 billion to $59.8
billion, or by around 0.3% of GDP.8
To see the evolution of this pattern over time we estimated counterfactual exports for all
7Head and Mayer (2014) suggest that the destination-GDP elasticity of exports is 0.84 on average.
However, trade costs such as long distances, different languages and trade barriers can affect the correlation
between exports and destinations’ GDPs.
8Note that our predicted flows incorporate only partial equilibrium effects.
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years from 1962 to 2012 using only the yearly GDP elasticity of Israel’s exports, i.e. the slope
of the linear fit as in Figure 6 for each individual year. In other words, this counterfactual
shows how large Israeli exports would be if only destination GDPs mattered. These are
graphed in Figure 2. It suggests that Israeli exports to boycott countries were well below
potential in most years except for brief periods in the late 1960s and 1990s.
We can also take advantage of the panel dimension of the data to estimate what happens
to Israeli exports when countries break ties or make amends. Examples of such policy change
include Iran (ties until 1979), Nicaragua (ties until 1982 and during 1992-2010), and Oman
(ties during 1996-2000) (the full list of country-years is given in footnote 3). These three
examples are depicted in Figure 7. The Oman case is particularly interesting as Israel
and Oman started reporting exports only after 1996 when the Gulf Cooperation Council
announced the end of the boycott enforcement and yet Oman’s breaking of ties in 2001 did
not affect Israeli exports to Oman while it put an end to Oman’s imports from Israel. Trade
with Iran on the other hand completely stopped being recorded by both partners after the
1979 Iranian Revolution, as both countries outlawed the trade. As for Nicaragua, after its
latest policy change in 2010 it started reporting more imports from Israel than Israel reported
exports, suggesting no boycott effect.
To estimate by how much such boycott-policy changes within a country affect Israeli
exports we estimate the following equation:
11
ln (EXit) = αi + σt + β1Boycottit + β2Controlsit + it
where where αi and σt are importer and year fixed effects, EXit are exports from Israel
to country i in year t, Boycottit is a dummy equal to one if the country-year bans trade
with Israel, and Controlsit are control variables, namely the logs of GDP and GDP per
capita. The coefficient on Boycottit , β1, gives us the effect of the boycott on Israeli exports
controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the destination market (e.g. cross-country
variation in consumer price indexes), global shocks to Israeli exports, time-varying changes
in market sizes (GDP), and in the level of economic development and factor costs (GDP per
capita).
In total there are 188 destination countries and 50 years of data, but many observations
are missing. To include as many country-years with unreported trade as possible, we replaced
missing values with zeros, but only for country-years that did report imports from any
country. (As some country-years do not report imports at all and we cannot be sure these
are cases of zero imports from Israel.) We then added $1 before taking logs (taking the
inverse hyperbolic sine instead does not alter the results, and neither does using a Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator).
Results are in columns 1-3 of Table 3. The coefficient on Boycottit is estimated around
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-2.4, which suggests that cutting ties decreased exports by 90% on average during 1962-2012.
To verify the robustness of our estimate we run the specifications of columns 1-3 but instead
of adding $1 before taking the log of exports we take the inverse hyperbolic sine, the log
of exports without adding $1, i.e. dropping zeros, or estimate a Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood estimator with exports on the left-hand side. Results in Table 4 confirm the size
and significance of our estimate and show the potential bias of omitting zeros.
To check whether changes in policy lead to illicit, or boycott-avoiding, exports, we
estimate the same equation but replacing exports on the left-hand side with a dummy
indicating Israeli missing exports. More precisely, “Israeli missing exports” is a dummy
equal to 1 if imports from Israel=0 and Israeli exports>0, and equal to zero otherwise.
In the case of Oman for example, the dummy switched from 0 to 1 in 2001. Results in
columns 4-6 suggest that the probability of observing “Israeli missing exports” increases by
around 20 percentage points when countries break ties with Israel. This is a large increase
as the average probability is 18% over the whole sample. It is thus more than doubled when
countries break ties. If we focus just on boycott countries, over the whole period the average
probability of observing “Israeli missing exports” is 65% on average and 77% during boycott
years.9
As a robustness check we replace Israeli exports and missing exports on the left-hand side
with equivalent measures of US exports (Table 5). The idea is to check whether countries
9We chose not to use the usual trade gap variable, i.e. the log difference between exports and imports as
imports are zero in most cases and therefore the variation in the trade gap would come only from changes
in reported Israeli exports.
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that boycott Israel, who might also be anti-American, might fail to report imports from the
US as well, despite no formal ban. The US can thus be seen as a counterfactual, i.e. what
would happen if there were no formal ban but still an anti-Israel sentiment. If we find an
effect, it would suggest that the coefficient picks up anti-US and anti-Israel sentiment rather
than the effect of a formal boycott. The lack of significant effects of the boycott on US
exports and US Missing exports confirms that our results are driven by the boycott policies.
4 CONCLUSION
The aim of our paper was to investigate Israel’s trade with boycott countries. As in previous
studies, we find that an asymmetric trade policy gives rise to illicit trade that is observable
in official trade statistics. The data suggest that Israel exported a total of $6.4 billion worth
of merchandise to boycott countries between 1962 and 2012, and most of it is missing from
importers’ reports. We find that electronic exports to Malaysia account for the lion’s share of
this trade yet it also includes a wide array of products from footwear to fruit and vegetables
exported to Arab League countries. We also show that the boycott is ineffective when it
comes to blocking the import of Israeli value-added embedded in other countries’ exports.
While our results suggest there are ways to circumvent the boycott, economic forces are
far from trumping politics. Israel’s exports to boycott countries would be 10 times larger
without the boycott.
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FIGURE 1
Israel’s exports to boycott countries: 1962-2012
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Note: Not all exports are reported by boycott countries as imports from
Israel. The green part of the bar shows the share that is missing from
importers’ reports. Source: UN Comtrade.
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TABLE 1
Israel’s exports to boycott countries: 1962-2012
Products Exports ($1,000) % of Israeli exports
Electrical machinery, apparatus 3,314,528 3.01
Special transact. Not class. 1,924,215 4.18
Chemical elements and compounds 227,825 0.54
Non metallic mineral manufactures 216,796 0.08
Machinery, other than electric 195,121 0.30
Chemical materials and products 119,181 0.46
Manufactures of metal, n.e.s 104,933 0.40
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 70,657 0.20
Fertilizers, manufactured 55,650 0.28
Fruit and vegetables 40,708 0.16
Plastic materials 39,778 0.25
Scientif & control instrum, photographic 25,800 0.10
Transport equipment 22,031 0.08
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 17,826 0.04
Dyeing, tanning and colouring material 15,214 1.27
Crude animal and vegetable material 14,019 0.18
Non ferrous metals 11,224 0.22
Wood and cork manufactures 10,349 0.94
Perfume materials, toilet & cleansing 8,322 0.14
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 7,953 0.20
Textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles 6,085 0.05
Miscellaneous food preparations 5,006 0.14
Petroleum and petroleum products 4,729 0.12
Crude fertilizers and crude mineral 4,720 0.11
Iron and steel 3,941 0.15
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 3,911 0.13
Clothing 3,829 0.03
Firearms of war and ammunition 2,392 0.18
Paper, paperboard and manufactures 1,315 0.05
Cereals and cereal preparations 1,124 0.10
Total 6,485,701 0.74
Source: UN Comtrade. Note: SITC rev. 1 two-digit clusters. Clusters
with less than $1,000,000 in trade are omitted for brevity.
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FIGURE 2
Israel’s exports to boycott countries
Israeli exports to boycott countries (log scale)
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Note: Exports are as reported by Israel and imports are as reported by
importing countries, both in UN Comtrade. Counterfactual exports are
predicted by destination GDP (see Figure 6 for the 2012 case).
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FIGURE 3
Missing exports from Israel, 1962-2012
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FIGURE 4
Malaysia imports from Israel
Trade value (USD million)
0
.
5
1
1.
5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Isreal exports Imports from Israel Imports from Unspecified
Source: UN Comtrade
19
TABLE 2
Malaysia imports from Israel (USD 1,000)
2000
Product Imports Israeli Imports from
from Israel exports Unspecified
Special transact. Not class. 0 714,268 54
Electrical machinery, apparatus 0 11,702 858,151
Chemical elements and compounds 0 2,911 0
Machinery, other than electric 0 2,146 283
Fertilizers, manufactured 0 509 0
Fruit and vegetables 0 285 24
Chemical materials and products 0 236 0
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0 139 0
Scientif & control instrum, photographic 0 81 1081
Plastic materials, etc. 0 46 0
Paper, paperboard and manufactures 0 34 9
Perfume materials, toilet & cleansing 0 17 0
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0 14 5
Miscellaneous food preparations 0 13 0
Medicinal and pharmaceutical 0 6 0
Crude fertilizers and crude mineral 0 4 11
Total 0 732,411 859,673
2010
Product Imports Israeli Imports from
from Israel exports Unspecified
Special transact. Not class. 0 608,935 27
Chemical elements and compounds 0 2,737 47
Electrical machinery, apparatus 0 2,614 600,363
Machinery, other than electric 0 583 48
Fertilizers, manufactured 0 452 3
Fruit and vegetables 0 390 43
Scientif & control instrum, photographic 0 127 103
Crude fertilizers and crude mineral 0 27 5
Perfume materials, toilet & cleansing 0 19 9
Paper, paperboard and manufactures 0 13 22
Manufactures of metal, n.e.s 0 8 54
Textile yarn, fabrics, made up arti 0 6 146
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0 6 191
Chemical materials and products, n. 0 4 7
Clothing 0 3 59
Total 0 615,924 601,128
Source: UN Comtrade. Note: SITC rev. 1 two-digit clusters. Clusters
with no Israeli exports are omitted for brevity.
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FIGURE 5
Israeli share of indirectly-imported value-added
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Source: TiVA. The horizontal line gives the average Israeli share of indirectly-imported value-added
across countries. The country codes give the importing country.
TABLE 3
Panel 1962-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln Israeli exports Israeli missing exports
Boycott -2.479** -2.380** -2.388** 0.198* 0.210* 0.211*
(0.952) (1.013) (1.028) (0.107) (0.111) (0.111)
ln GDP 0.899*** 1.918*** 0.00392 -0.0607
(0.185) (0.614) (0.0174) (0.0553)
ln GDPPC -0.995* 0.0629
(0.554) (0.0506)
Obs. 6,389 6,015 6,012 6,389 6,015 6,012
R-squared 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.691 0.703 0.703
Note: Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Two-way
clustered (country and year) s.e. in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Israeli missing exports is a dummy=1 if imports from Israel=0 and
Israeli exports>0, zero otherwise.
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FIGURE 6
Israeli exports and destination GDP in 2012
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TABLE 4
Robustness on Panel 1962-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Arcsinh No zeros PPML
Boycott -2.694*** -2.593** -2.602** -1.470** -1.361** -1.444** -2.884* -2.802** -3.518*
(0.998) (1.060) (1.076) (0.617) (0.674) (0.677) (1.691) (1.418) (2.011)
ln GDP 0.915*** 2.142*** 0.913*** 1.606*** 0.910*** 2.832***
(0.195) (0.648) (0.148) (0.430) (0.133) (0.623)
ln GDPPC -1.197** -0.659 -2.061***
(0.587) (0.402) (0.616)
Obs. 6,389 6,015 6,012 5,224 5,016 5,016 6,366 5,962 5,959
R-squared 0.864 0.864 0.866 0.875 0.883 0.884 0.972 0.983 0.984
Note: Dependant variable is arcsinh(exports) in columns 1-3, ln(exports) in columns 4-6, and exports in
columns 7-9. Columns 7-9 are PPML estimates. Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions.
Two-way clustered (country and year) s.e. in parenthesis in columns 1-6, country clustered s.e. in columns
7-9. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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FIGURE 7
Case studies
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TABLE 5
Placebo panel 1962-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln US exports US missing exports
Boycott 0.450 0.307 0.304 0.00539 0.00463 0.00435
(0.873) (0.819) (0.817) (0.00740) (0.00772) (0.00777)
ln GDP 0.824*** 1.201*** -0.00668 0.0318
(0.180) (0.390) (0.00491) (0.0258)
ln GDPPC -0.367 -0.0375
(0.448) (0.0244)
Obs. 6,389 6,015 6,012 6,389 6,015 6,012
R-squared 0.864 0.885 0.885 0.135 0.132 0.139
Note: Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Two-way
clustered (country and year) s.e. in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
US missing exports is a Dummy=1 if imports from US=0 and US exports>0, zero
otherwise.
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